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The Accreditation of Religious Law Schools in Canada 
and the United States 
John Boersma* 
Ongoing litigation in Canada suggests that the legal status of 
religiously affiliated law schools could be in jeopardy. In Canada, 
regulatory authorities have sought to deny accreditation status to a 
religiously affiliated law school (Trinity Western University) due to its 
commitment to a traditional Christian understanding of marriage. 
According to Canadian provincial authorities, this commitment has a 
discriminatory effect on LGBT students. Similar events could potentially 
occur in the United States. It is possible that American regulatory bodies 
could seek either to rescind or withhold accreditation from a religiously 
affiliated law school because of the discriminatory effects of its policies. 
This comparative Article argues that as a matter both of public policy 
and law, the regulatory bodies concerned with the accreditation of law 
schools in both Canada and the United States have ample reason to 
accredit religiously affiliated law schools. First, as a matter of public 
policy, diversity in the type of law schools is beneficial due to the pluralism 
it engenders. Pluralism has long been recognized as a force for social 
stability in liberal democracies and is continually cited as beneficial by 
both Canadian and American courts. Furthermore, as a matter of law, 
both Canada and the United States provide for a robust protection of 
religious freedom that encompasses religiously affiliated law schools. This 
Article concludes that, as a result, regulatory authorities in Canada and 
the United States ought to encourage the proliferation of religiously 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, tensions have long existed between 
religiously affiliated law schools and their accrediting bodies.1 Indeed, 
the issue of how academic freedom and labor laws apply to religiously 
affiliated law schools has often been litigated in American courts.2 In 
contrast, Canada has, until recently, seen no such litigation; the simple 
reason being that no religious organization in Canada has, until 
 
 1. See Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What’s “Religious Diversity” Got 
to do with It?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 427, 428 (1995) (“[T]here are tensions in 
the accreditation process between religiously affiliated law schools, the ABA, and the AALS . . . . 
Given the perennially controversial nature of the issues involved in the accreditation process, it 
would be surprising if such tensions did not exist.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000); Broderick v. 
Catholic Univ. of Am., 365 F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973); Granfield v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 
530 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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recently, attempted to establish a religiously affiliated law school.3 
However, litigation is currently before a number of Canadian courts 
regarding the accreditation of Trinity Western University’s (TWU) 
proposed School of Law.4 
TWU is a liberal arts university situated in Langley, British 
Columbia (BC). It was founded in 1962 by the Evangelical Free 
Church of America and currently “exists under the authority of the 
Evangelical Free Churches of Canada and the United States.”5 In June 
2012, TWU submitted a proposal for its law school to BC’s Minister 
of Advanced Education and to the Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada (FLSC).6 After TWU secured permission from both these 
authorities, the individual law societies of the various provinces and 
territories reviewed the FLSC’s approval, and  while a majority of the 
law societies approved TWU’s School of Law, both the Law Society 
of Upper Canada (LSUC) and Nova Scotia’s Barrister’s Society 
(NSBS) rejected TWU’s proposed law school.7 Half a year later, the 
Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC) reversed its approval “based 
on a referendum of the Province’s lawyers.”8 As a result of this 
reversal, the Minister of Advanced Education in BC “revoke[d] his 
consent for the TWU School of Law.”9 
Each of the law societies that refused to approve TWU’s School of 
Law indicated that the school’s Community Covenant was the reason 
 
 3. See Matthew Block, A Victory for Religious Freedom in Canada, FIRST THOUGHTS 
BLOG (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2015/01/a-victory-
for-religious-freedom-in-canada. 
 4. See Emily Zmak, Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society Files Appeal, TWU.CA, 
http://www.twu.ca/news/2015/089-nsbs-appeal.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2015); see also 
The Law Soc’y of B.C., Law Society Appeals Decision in TWU v. Law Society of BC (Jan. 5, 
2016), https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=4185&t=Law-Society-appeals-decision-in-
TWU-v.-Law-Society-of-BC. 
 5. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25, para. 28, 32 (Can.) (“[The 
connection between TWU and the Evangelical Free Churches of Canada] is not merely an 
historical connection or a nominal one. The religious denominations involved very much control 
what happens at TWU.”). 
 6. Trinity W. Univ., Timeline, http://www.twu.ca/proposed-school-law/timeline (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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for its denial.10 TWU’s Community Covenant commits students to a 
“code of behaviour that TWU says is in keeping with Christian 
principles as they are interpreted in the evangelical tradition.”11 
Included in this code are a variety of Christian practices, including the 
pledge to “cultivate Christian virtues,” to “live exemplary lives,” and 
to “treat all persons with respect and dignity.”12 The provision that 
prompted several law societies to reject TWU’s School of Law 
prohibits “sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage 
between a man and a woman.”13 According to the law societies, while 
this provision is neutrally phrased, it has the effect of discriminating 
against LGBT students.14 The provision, by its terms, limits the sexual 
activity of all students in the same manner. In practice, however, the 
provision allows married heterosexual students to engage in sexually 
intimate behavior, while prohibiting married LGBT students from 
engaging in such behavior. In response to the law societies’ refusal to 
approve TWU’s proposed law school, TWU filed lawsuits against the 
LSUC, the NSBS, and the LSBC.15 
At issue in the TWU lawsuits is the constitutionality of denying 
accreditation to a religious law school that restricts admission to those 
 
 10. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., Treasurer’s Statement Regarding Vote on TWU Law School, 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/newsarchives.aspx?id=2147485737&cid=2147498273 (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2016); N.S. Barrister’s Soc’y, Council Votes for Option C in Trinity Western University 
Law School Decision, http://nsbs.org/news/2014/04/council-votes-option-c-trinity-western-
university-law-school-decision (last visited Oct. 11, 2016); LAW SOC’Y OF B.C., APRIL 11, 2014 
BENCHER MEETING MINUTES 7 (2014), http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/about/
minutes/2014-04-11.pdf. 
 11. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc., [2015] NSSC 25, para. 33 (Can.). 
 12. Trinity W. Univ., Community Covenant Agreement, http://twu.ca/student
handbook/twu-community-covenant-agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Respondent’s Brief at 4–6, Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barrister’s Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 
100 (Can.) (No. 427840), http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/
RespondentsBrief_18-11-2014.pdf; Written Argument of the Law Society of British Columbia 
at 20, Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [2015] BCSC 2326 (Can.) (No. 149837), 
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-argument-LSBC.pdf; Factum of the 
Respondent at 9–10, Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2016] ONCA 518 (Can.) 
(No. C61116), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/Factum%20of%20the%20Respondent
%20LSUC%20-%202016.pdf. 
 15. Trinity Western Launches Court Action to Defend Law School, CBC NEWS (May 6, 
2014, 4:07 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/trinity-western-launches-
court-action-to-defend-law-school-1.2633816. 
1.BOERSMA.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2016  2:41 PM 
1081 The Accreditation of Religious Law Schools 
 1085 
who sign its community covenant,16 which contains arguably 
discriminatory provisions. At bottom, these lawsuits do not concern a 
new issue, as religious law schools in the United States often require 
members to sign various community covenants.17 What is new with 
regard to this litigation, however, is that accrediting agencies and state 
regulatory bodies, in response to revolutionary changes in societal 
attitudes to sexual orientation,18 are seeking to deny a religious law 
school access to various benefits as a result of its community covenant. 
This litigation has implications far wider than TWU’s capacity to open 
a law school (although to TWU this is, no doubt, a significant 
implication). Indeed, the societal changes that have preceded this 
litigation are, of course, well under way in the United States,19 and it 
is conceivable that American religious law schools may face legal 
challenges to their accreditation as well. In addition, this litigation 
touches upon the role we expect independent associations to play in 
liberal democratic societies. 
This Article will argue that as a matter of public policy and law 
religiously affiliated law schools should not be denied accreditation in 
either Canada or America based on their admissions policies, provided 
such admissions policies are reasonably related to the faith 
commitments with which the university is allied. Part I will provide a 
brief preface to the legal analysis by explaining the importance of the 
 
 16. Notice for Judicial Review at 2, N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y v. Trinity W. Univ., [2015] 
NSSC 100 (Can.) (No. 427840), http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_
Submissions/Notice_JudicialReviewTWU_May2014.pdf; Petition to the Court at 3, Law Soc’y 
of B.C. v. Trinity W. Univ., 2015 BCSC 2326 (Can.) (No. 149837), https://
www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-Petition%20LSBC.pdf; Notice of Application to 
Divisional Court for Judicial Review at 8–9, Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] 
ONSC 4250 (Can.) (No. 250/14), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_
Public/News/News_Archive/2014/notice-to-the-public-re-interventions-and-
application(1).pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., Fritz Snyder & Shirley Goza, Law School Honor Codes, 76 L. LIBR. J. 585, 
585 (1983) (showing that students at Emory University School of Law, which is formally 
affiliated with the United Methodist Church, must acknowledge that they agree to the honor 
code by signing). 
 18. Bob Gallagher, LGBT Progress is a Canadian Success Story, THESTAR.COM (June 2, 
2016), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/06/02/lgbt-progress-is-a-
canadian-success-story.html (stating that “we can be amazed at how far Canada has come in such 
a short time” with respect to the rights of LGBT people). 
 19. Peter Baker, Same-Sex Marriage Support Shows Pace of Social Change Accelerating, 
N.Y. TIMES (May, 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/us/same-sex-marriage-
support-shows-pace-of-social-change-accelerating.html?_r=0. 
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issue and why accreditation agencies should adopt a pluralistic 
approach in the accreditation of law schools that allows for the 
teaching of law from a variety of different religious viewpoints. Part II 
will explain why the relevant law in both Canada and the United States 
favors the accreditation of religiously affiliated law schools.20 
I. PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS LAW SCHOOLS 
The accreditation of religious law schools may appear, at first 
glance, to be purely a legal matter. Indeed, a legal justification made 
within the confines of the Canadian or American legal paradigm will 
without doubt be the most influential justification for any decision 
that is made regarding the accreditation of religious law schools in 
those countries. Nevertheless, public policy and social theory will 
likely play an ancillary role in any judicial decisions. In fact, it could 
even be argued that the legal justifications are secondary to the social 
theory or public policy justifications, given the fact that legal theory is 
concerned with instantiating various social norms into a coherent and 
binding schematic.21 As will be made clear, this is particularly the case 
with regards to the accreditation of religious law schools, as the 
decision as to whether such institutions merit accreditation will have 
social consequences. In light of this recognition, this Article will begin 
with a brief discussion of public policy justifications in favor of the 
accreditation of religious law schools before turning to 
legal justifications. 
As a matter of public policy, the American Bar Association (ABA) and 
the Canadian law societies—both of which are involved in the process of 
 
 20. For an analysis of religious law schools’ right to expressive association in the United 
States, see Kristin B. Gerdy, “The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object”: When 
Antidiscrimination Standards and Religious Belief Collide in ABA-Accredited Law Schools, 85 
OR. L. REV. 943 (2006). While Kristin Gerdy makes the case that religious law schools are 
protected in the United States by way of a First Amendment right to expressive association, this 
Article argues that such law schools are protected by way of the hybrid right articulated in 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 21. See Craig Calhoun, Commentary, Social Theory and the Law: Systems Theory, 
Normative Justification, and Postmodernism, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 398, 398 (1989) (“[J]ust as law 
is a part of society, not something separate to be related to society, so legal theory is part of the 
same enterprise with social theory. Legal theorists must inevitably work with implicit accounts 
of what social life is like, of what the range of possibilities open for its change may be, of how 
individual action relates to social structure, and of what holds society together.”). 
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law school accreditation22—have ample reason to endorse the 
proliferation of religiously affiliated law schools. This is due to the fact 
that as independent, voluntary legal associations the ABA and the 
Canadian law societies are uniquely positioned to help their respective 
countries to foster the pluralism necessary for a healthy liberal democracy. 
Both the American and the Canadian Supreme Court have 
recognized the important role religious pluralism plays in a liberal 
democracy. For example, in Walz,23 Justice Brennan of the American 
Supreme Court writes, “[R]eligious organizations . . . uniquely 
contribute to the pluralism of American society.”24 Justice Brennan 
further writes that a “diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise 
[is] essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”25 Similarly, in Loyola 
High School,26 the Canadian Supreme Court cited the European Court 
of Human Rights’ recognition of “the relationship between religious 
freedom, secularism and pluralism” approvingly27 and, as a 
consequence, concluded that “a secular state . . . supports pluralism . 
. .[b]ecause it allows communities with different values and practices 
to peacefully co-exist.”28 Furthermore, section 27 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that the Charter is to be 
interpreted in such a way that enhances Canada’s multicultural 
heritage29—a heritage that has been recognized by the Supreme Court 
to include religious pluralism.30 Thus, the legal systems of both 
 
 22. The Canadian law societies have the broad power to regulate the practice of law in 
their respective provinces or territories. See, e.g., Law Soc’y of Upper Can., About the Law Society, 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=905 (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). In contrast, the American 
Bar Association has the explicit power to accredit law schools. See 2015–2016 ABA STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, at v (A.B.A. 2015) [hereinafter 
A.B.A. Standards]. 
 23. Walz v. Tax Comm. N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 24. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Loyola High Sch. v. Quebec, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (Can.). 
 27. Id. at para. 45. 
 28. Id. The Court went on to note, however, “that religious differences [do not] trump 
core national values” and that core national values are essential to ensuring that “pluralism 
work[s].” Id. at para. 46–47. Thus, the Court found that both pluralism and a commitment to 
core national values are necessary for a democratic, liberal state. See id. at para. 48. 
 29. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 27, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 30. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 296–97 (Can.). 
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countries see religious pluralism as a policy that ought to be supported 
for the health of liberal democracies. 
The field of education in both countries has also long stressed 
diversity’s role in preparing students for the workforce.31 The 
academy’s commitment to diversity is perhaps nowhere more evident 
than in the realm of legal education.32 Indeed, both the ABA and the 
Canadian law societies have taken it upon themselves to actively 
promote diversity.33 In light of this commitment to diversity, what are 
we to make of the stated positions of the Canadian and American 
regulators of legal education concerning religious law schools? 
Specifically, what are we to make of ABA Standard 205—which 
prohibits American law schools from precluding students’ admission 
on the basis of religion34—and the obstacles facing TWU’s proposed 
school of law? 
At first glance, the relatively hostile position of the ABA and the 
Canadian law societies towards religious law schools seems to make a 
great deal of sense.35 Indeed, it is quite possible that religious law 
schools may inhibit diversity, as students of particular religious 
backgrounds will naturally gravitate towards law schools with whose 
mission statements they can identify. As Robert Destro has noted in 
Marquette’s Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, concerns 
 
 31. Assn. of Am. Univs., On the Importance of Diversity in University Admissions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A27 (“A very substantial portion of our curriculum is enhanced by the 
discourse made possible by the heterogeneous backgrounds of our students.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Ann Mallatt Killenbeck, Bakke, with Teeth?: The Implications of Grutter v. 
Bollinger in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1, 39 (2009). 
 33. A.B.A. Standards, supra note 22, at ch. 2, stand. 206; Faisal Bhabha, Towards a 
Pedagogy of Diversity in Legal Education, 52 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 59, 65 (2014) (“[A]ll of the 
provincial and territorial regulatory bodies have adopted some form of diversity policy . . . .”). 
 34. A.B.A. Standards, supra note 22, at ch. 2, stand. 205(c) (precluding student 
admission on the basis of religion, but noting that “religious affiliation or purpose policies as to 
admission, retention, and employment [are allowed] only to the extent that these policies are 
protected by the United States Constitution”). 
 35. See, e.g., SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA’S FIRST SECTION: ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR 
109 (1993) (noting that during the revision of Standard 211, following the Oral Roberts 
University case, “Henry Ramsey, Jr., chairman of the Accreditation Committee, said he opposed 
the Standard as presented because he felt it could be used by schools to discriminate against non-
believers . . . . Council members modified the proposal further by inserting a new paragraph 
stating that law schools ‘should not use admission policies that preclude a diverse student body 
in terms of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.’ The Council felt this was an important 
addition considering the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bakke that diversity of a student body has 
important educational value.”). 
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“that the beliefs or cultural backgrounds of the professors and 
students might affect either the substantive content of teaching or the 
tenor of the classroom environment . . . are not misplaced. They can 
and do.”36 
However, religious law schools can also serve to maintain diversity 
in the legal profession. While such law schools may reinforce the 
particular cultures and religious viewpoints of the students that attend 
them, this tends to ensure that such students maintain their diverse 
religious identities. The maintenance of such religious diversity has 
been held to have a positive impact on liberal democracy due to the 
unique viewpoints they offer to the democratic experience. For 
example, Brady argues that religious groups function as “training 
grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and responsibilities, they 
are ‘schools for democracy.’”37 Accordingly, the “political process 
is . . . enriched as religious individuals band together in groups to 
develop their beliefs and contribute to the democratic process.”38 
In contrast, a hostile stance towards religious law schools may lead 
to a homogenization of legal education that has negative effects on 
diversity. Such a hostile stance would ensure that students are 
educated, not in accordance with their traditional religious 
backgrounds, but instead in accordance with the mainstream of 
American or Canadian culture. As a result, while the ABA and 
Canadian law societies’ approach to achieving diversity may ensure 
that every race, creed, and nation is represented in the classroom, it is 
not clear that after three years of law school every race, creed, and 
nation will walk at the graduation ceremony. Instead, it is possible that 
the persons leaving law school will be shorn of their identifying 
characteristics and will instead represent the homogeneous 
mainstream of American or Canadian culture. Given the benefits of 
pluralism, accrediting agencies ought to adopt an approach to 
accreditation that recognizes “the value of innovation and diversity in 
the teaching of law.”39 Allowing for diversity in the type of law schools 
 
 36. Destro, supra note 1, at 452. 
 37. Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons 
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1700–01. 
 38. Leilani N. Fisher, Institutional Religious Exemptions: A Balancing Approach, 2014 
BYU L. REV. 415, 424. 
 39. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can., National Requirement for Approving Canadian 
Common Law Degree Programs, https://web.archive.org/web/20141218183131/
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ensures diversity to a much greater extent than enforcing diversity in 
the composition of law schools. 
Of course, a pluralistic approach to the accreditation of law schools 
could potentially foster a divisive sectarianism in a manner that 
threatens social cohesion. For example, Steven R. Smith, writing in 
Marquette’s Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, argues 
that “while diversity is generally a positive value, there are some kinds 
of diversity we do not seek. For example, legal education is not worse 
off because there are no law schools that refuse to admit members of 
minority groups.”40 As a result of this danger, a pluralistic approach to 
the accreditation of law schools would necessarily have to be 
circumscribed by reasonable limits so as to avoid such                        
undue discrimination.41 
Despite the validity of concern regarding divisive sectarianism, 
democratic countries generally have more to fear from excessive social 
cohesion. Indeed, in his early nineteenth-century book Democracy in 
America, Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued that the degree of 
social cohesion or egalitarianism inherent in democracies could lead 
to despotism.42 While Tocqueville was writing with direct reference 
only to the United States, his writings have implications for liberal 
democracies in general and, in particular, for Canada, due to the 
historical and cultural affinities between the United States 
and Canada.43F43 
According to Tocqueville, the egalitarianism of democracy has the 
potential to lead to tyranny in two ways. First, egalitarian democracy’s 
 
http://www.flsc.ca/en/national-requirement-for-approving-canadian-common-law-degree-
programs/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 40. Steven R. Smith, Accreditation and Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 78 MARQ. L. 
REV. 361, 363 (1995). 
 41. While a detailed analysis of such reasonable limits is beyond the scope of this Article, 
an approach that may be feasible is one that distinguishes between status and conduct. By means 
of this distinction, religiously affiliated law schools would be able to use their admissions policies 
to discriminate based on conduct (such as sexual relations), but would not be able to discriminate 
based on status (such as race or gender). 
 42. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 641 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop eds., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835 & 1840). 
 43. See David Schneiderman, Edmund Burke, John Whyte and Themes in Canadian 
Constitutional Culture, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 578, 596 (2006) (arguing that the foundational values 
of Canada’s constitutional order “are largely liberal, founded upon a desire for both liberty and 
security,” and suggesting that “there is little to distinguish [Canada] from other operative liberal 
political cultures, including the United States”). 
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tendency toward majority rule44 can lead to a tyranny of the majority, 
whereby individuals are placed at the mercy of the majority.45 Second, 
the assumption of individualism in egalitarianism may lead to tyranny. 
According to Tocqueville, egalitarianism tends to produce 
individualism, which compounds the threat of tyranny posed by 
majority rule,46 because individuals will be incapable of joining forces 
to counter the threat of tyranny.47 As a result, Tocqueville saw 
democracy’s insistence on majority rule, coupled with its tendency 
towards individualism, as creating the conditions for tyranny 
to flourish. 
Despite this potential for despotism, Harvey Mansfield argues that 
“Tocqueville did not despair of democracy. He neither scorned it nor 
opposed it. On the whole, he approved of it.”48 This positive appraisal 
was owed in part to the prominent role played by two forces in 
American society: independent, voluntary associations and law. Ralph 
Hancock notes that Tocqueville saw the wide variety of independent 
associations as countering the individualism to which democracies 
tend.49 Associations, by their very nature, compel people to come 
together and focus on goods beyond themselves, thus tempering the 
individualism inherent in democracy.50 In addition, associations 
formed “for moral and intellectual ends” (e.g., religiously affiliated 
law schools) bring “to the public eye new, uncommon sentiments and 
 
 44. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 42, at 236 (“The moral empire of the majority is founded 
in part on the idea that there is more enlightenment and wisdom in many men united than in 
one alone, in the number of legislators than in their choice. It is the theory of equality applied 
to intellects.”). 
 45. Id. at 241 (“When a man or a party suffers from an injustice in the United States, 
whom do you want him to address? Public opinion? that is what forms the majority; the 
legislative body? it represents the majority and obeys it blindly; the executive power? it is named 
by the majority and serves as its passive instrument . . . .”). 
 46. Id. at 483–84 (explaining that the equality of conditions prevalent in democratic 
countries ensures that there are a great number of individuals who are self-sufficient. This self-
sufficiency causes them to believe that they “owe nothing to anyone, they expect so to speak 
nothing from anyone; they are in the habit of always considering themselves in isolation”). 
 47. See id. at 485 (writing, concerning the connection between individualism and tyranny, 
that “[d]espotism . . . sees the most certain guarantee of its own duration in the isolation 
of men”). 
 48. Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, Introduction to TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 
42, at xx. 
 49. See Ralph Hancock, Tocqueville on the Good of American Federalism, 20 PUBLIUS 89, 
103–04 (1990). 
 50. Id. at 104. 
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ideas.”51 Thus, the pluralism provided by such associations serves to 
both temper individualism and bring alternative viewpoints to bear on 
public affairs. 
Law similarly counteracts the negative aspects otherwise entailed 
by majority rule. Tocqueville saw the authority “given to lawyers . . . 
[as] the most powerful barrier today against the lapses of 
democracy.”52 Law serves to temper the passions of the people, in 
particular majority factions, thereby allowing rational discourse to 
prevail.53 Thus, both independent associations and the law play a role 
in protecting democracies from tyranny. 
The ABA and the law societies of Canada are among the more 
significant independent associations that can counteract potential 
threats to the vitality of North American democracy, and thereby can 
help prevent its lapse into despotism. As noted, a hostile position to 
religious law schools can have a homogenizing effect on legal 
education. This approach to education is inherently egalitarian, as 
people of all cultures and religions will be educated in the same 
manner and all cultures and religions will be held to be of equal value. 
As a result of such egalitarianism, the pre-existing value judgments of 
these cultures and religions also come under equal scrutiny and 
critique. The danger of this approach is that it can be used to 
substitute pre-existing attitudes, loyalties, and values with those 
favored by the state, thereby destroying diversity and contributing to 
the establishment of despotism. 
The law societies of Canada and the ABA, in their role as the 
accrediting agencies of law schools, are uniquely positioned to 
counteract the homogenization of legal education. Indeed, these 
accrediting agencies have the very characteristics that Tocqueville 
argued serve to counteract democracy’s tendency towards tyranny. 
They are not only voluntary and independent associations but also 
consist entirely of legal professionals. Their associational character 
protects against democracy’s tendency towards individualism, while 
their legal aspect counteracts democracy’s tendency towards 
majoritarianism. Thus, these institutions have the potential to act as 
 
 51. Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 48, at xxiii. 
 52. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 42, at 251. 
 53. Id. at 256 (“When the American people let themselves be intoxicated by their passions 
or become so self-indulgent as to be carried away by their ideas, the lawyers make them feel an 
almost invisible brake that moderates and arrests them.”). 
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powerful counter-majoritarian institutions, thereby safeguarding civil 
liberty.54 As a result, when accrediting law schools, the ABA and the 
law societies of Canada should adopt a pluralistic approach. Rather 
than ensuring that only law schools conforming to the dictates of 
majoritarian morality receive accreditation,55 these institutions should 
promote alternative law schools so as to ensure that social cohesion 
does not devolve into the tyranny of the majority. 
II. LEGAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED LAW 
SCHOOLS 
The pluralistic approach to the accreditation of religious law 
schools is not only sound public policy, but, as will be made clear, is 
required as a matter of law in both Canada and the United States. This 
Part will proceed in two sections. Section A will analyze the 
protections afforded religious law schools under Canadian law. 
Specifically, it will argue that the Canadian law societies do not have 
the jurisdiction to regulate legal education in Canada. Furthermore, 
it will show that religious law schools that employ arguably 
discriminatory admissions policies are protected under a proper 
balancing of the right to religious freedom and the right of equality 
articulated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It will 
then conclude with a brief discussion of the current status of the 
ongoing litigation involving TWU’s proposed school of law. 
Section B will turn to the American context and examine the 
legislation and jurisprudence that protects religious law schools in the 
United States. First, this section will briefly discuss the standards the 
ABA has adopted for accreditation. Next it will examine the rights of 
religious law schools in light of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. It will argue that religious law schools are free from 
 
 54. The ABA was expressly set up as a self-governing body out of an acknowledgement 
that the legal profession should be independent from domination by the government. See, e.g., 
ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2 (7th ed. 
2011) (“An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under 
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are 
not dependent on government for the right to practice.”). 
 55. Polls suggest that there is a growing trend in the acceptance of gay rights in general 
and, in particular, of gay marriage. See, e.g., Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. 
CTR. (May 12, 2016), http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-
marriage/  (showing that “[b]ased on polling in 2016, a majority of Americans (55%) support 
same-sex marriage, compared with 37% who oppose it,” while polling in 2001 found that 
“Americans opposed same-sex marriage by a margin of 57% to 35%”). 
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complying with neutrally phrased anti-discrimination legislation 
because they enjoy a “hybrid right” consisting of both the right to 
freedom of religion and the right to freedom of association. This 
section will then conclude with a brief discussion of the current status 
of the legal realm vis à vis religious freedom and homosexual rights. 
A. Legal Analysis Under Canadian Law 
There are a number of factors in the Canadian legal system that 
weigh in favor of the accreditation of TWU. This section will begin by 
explaining the basic requirements a law school must meet in order to 
receive accreditation. Next, this section will discuss the jurisdiction of 
the law societies and suggest that they do not have the legal mandate 
to regulate legal education in Canada. Last, it will explain the state of 
the law in the realm of religious freedom and in the realm of equality 
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As will be 
made clear, the Supreme Court has rejected a hierarchical approach to 
rights, whereby certain rights would be privileged over others, and has 
instead opted for a balancing approach. Applying such a balancing 
approach to the religious freedom rights of religious law schools and 
the equality rights of LGBT individuals weighs in favor of religious 
law schools. 
1. National requirement 
The regulation of the practice of law in Canada is undertaken by 
the law societies of Canada. Each Canadian province and territory has 
its own law society, which is mandated by provincial and territorial 
statute to regulate the practice of law in the public interest.56 These 
law societies have the monopolistic power to determine which law 
school graduates they will admit to their society—a prerequisite to 
practicing law in each province and territory.57 That the law societies 
have the sole power to regulate an industry on behalf of the state 
suggests that they are state actors and must comply with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; although the Supreme Court has 
 
 56. See, e.g., Law Soc’y of Upper Can., supra note 22. 
 57. Geoff Plant, Law Society Benchers Put in a Tough Spot with Trinity Western Debate, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (June 13, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
british-columbia/law-society-benchers-put-in-a-tough-spot-with-trinity-western-
debate/article19167527/. 
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never directly stated that the law societies must comply with the 
Charter, case law strongly suggests that rules promulgated and the 
decisions made by the law societies must comply with the Charter.58 
In 2010, the law societies of Canada “agreed on a uniform 
national requirement that graduates of Canadian common law 
programs must meet to enter law society admission programs,” which 
would be governed by the FLSC.59 As part of this agreement, the 
FLSC created the Canadian Common Law Program Approval 
Committee, which is responsible for ensuring that the various 
common law programs of Canada meet the National Requirement.60 
The National Requirement stipulates that in order to be approved, 
law schools must offer a curriculum that covers certain substantive 
legal courses and skills, including “the core principles of public law in 
Canada,” such as constitutional law, criminal law, and administrative 
law, and “the foundational legal principles that apply to private 
relationships,” such as “contracts, torts and property law.”61 However, 
in establishing the National Requirement, the FLSC took a decidedly 
Tocquevillian stance in favor of pluralism and “determined that it 
would be neither necessary nor appropriate to dictate how individual 
law schools choose to teach the required competencies” because 
“[t]he Federation and its member law societies recognize the 
importance of academic freedom and the value of innovation and 
diversity in the teaching of law.”62 As a result of this position in favor 
of pluralism, the Approval Committee did not view TWU School of 
 
 58. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25, para. 9 (Can.) (“The 
NSBS as a state actor has to comply with the Charter.”); see Black v. Law Soc’y of Alberta, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 591, 634–35 (Can.) (finding that two rules of the Law Society of Alberta 
violated section 6 of the Charter); Eldridge v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
624, 654 (Can.) (noting that “it is a basic principle of constitutional theory that since legislatures 
may not enact laws that infringe the Charter, they cannot authorize or empower another person 
or entity to do so”). But see id. (“It is possible, however, for a legislature to give authority to a 
body that is not subject to the Charter.”). 
 59. Kent Kuran, Law Societies Introduce New Requirements, ULTRA VIRES (Oct. 30, 
2013), http://ultravires.ca/2013/10/law-societies-introduce-new-requirements/. 
 60. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can., Canadian Common Law Program Approval Status, 
http://flsc.ca/resources/canadian-common-law-program-approval-status/ (last visited Sept. 
16, 2016). 
 61. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can., National Requirement, http://docs.flsc.ca/National-
Requirement-ENG.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 62. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can., supra note 39. 
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Law’s community covenant as a hindrance to its application 
for accreditation.63 
2. Law societies’ jurisdiction and the public interest 
While Canada’s law societies agreed to implement the National 
Requirement,64 they also have the statutory duty “to regulate the legal 
profession in the public interest.”65 As a result, Canada’s law societies 
have the authority to maintain certain standards for an individual 
seeking admission to the law society. This raises the question as to 
whether the law societies have the jurisdiction to refuse to admit 
individuals to their law society merely because they received their 
degree from a school that employs an arguably discriminatory 
admission policy, such as the one at issue in the TWU litigation. The 
answer to this question may depend, in part, on the specific statutory 
language that grants each law society its mandate. For example, the 
statute governing the NSBS provides that “[t]he purpose of the 
Society is to uphold and protect the public interest in the practice of 
law,”66 suggesting that the Society’s jurisdiction is limited. In contrast, 
the statute governing the LSUC provides that “[t]he Society has a 
duty to protect the public interest,”67 suggesting a more 
expansive jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court’s well-known 2001 decision, British 
Columbia College of Teachers,68 seems to imply that the phrase “in the 
public interest,” which confers a more expansive jurisdiction, allows a 
regulatory body to consider the admissions policies of an institution 
when making a regulatory decision.69 In this case, the Court had to 
decide whether the British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) 
could constitutionally refuse to certify teachers who were set to 
graduate from TWU on the basis of TWU’s allegedly discriminatory 
Community Standards (the predecessor to the current Community 
 
 63. FED’N OF L. SOC’YS OF CAN., SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRINITY 
WESTERN’S PROPOSED SCHOOL OF LAW: FINAL REPORT 10–12 (DEC. 2013), 
http://docs.flsc.ca/SpecialAdvisoryReportFinal.pdf. 
 64. Kuran, supra note 59. 
 65. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can., supra note 39. 
 66. Legal Profession Act, S.N.S. 2004, c 28 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 67. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c L.8 (Can.). 
 68. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (Can.). 
 69. Id. at 774. 
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Covenant).70 The Supreme Court noted that the mandate to regulate 
in “the public interest” should not be interpreted as merely conferring 
the authority to regulate “skills and knowledge” but should be 
interpreted in a more comprehensive manner.71 The Supreme Court’s 
decision seems to imply that law societies would be acting within their 
jurisdiction if they refused to admit individuals graduating from a 
university with an arguably discriminatory admission policy, as long as 
they did so in the public interest. 
Despite its expansive interpretation of “the public interest,” 
however, the Court suggested that this interpretation was limited to 
the particular context involved in the British Columbia College of 
Teachers case. Indeed, the Court specifically stated that the BCCT’s 
role in the regulation of teachers was unique. “[T]eachers,” the Court 
stated, “are a medium for the transmission of values” and have the 
responsibility of teaching in schools, which “are meant to develop civic 
virtue and responsible citizenship.”72 As a result, the Court held that 
“[i]t would not be correct, in this context, to limit the scope of [the 
regulatory body] to a determination of skills and knowledge.”73 
Having determined that the phrase “the public interest” ought to have 
an expansive interpretation due to teachers’ unique role in society, the 
Court went on to hold that “[a]bsent concrete evidence that training 
teachers at TWU fosters discrimination in the public schools of BC, 
the freedom of individuals to adhere to certain religious beliefs while 
at TWU should be respected.”74 Thus, even though the Court 
acknowledged the legitimacy of considering “the public interest” in 
this particular case, the Court nevertheless sided with TWU against 
the BCCT. 
Of course, lawyers perform a vastly different task than teachers. 
Lawyers are not tasked with transmitting values or developing civic 
virtue in impressionable children. Rather, they are called to be zealous 
advocates of their clients. Given lawyers’ vastly different role, allegedly 
discriminatory admissions practices do not have the potential to 
 
 70. See Written Argument of Trinity Western University and Brayden Volkenant at 35–
36, Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2015 BCSC 2326 (Can.) (No. 149837), 
https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-argument.pdf. 
 71. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 774. 
 72. Id. at 774, 800. 
 73. Id. at 774 (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. at 775. 
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impact the practice of lawyers in the same way that they might impact 
the practice of public school teachers. As a result, it is not clear that 
the expansive interpretation of the phrase “in the public interest,” as 
used in the British Columbia College of Teachers case, is warranted in 
litigation involving law societies. 
Furthermore, Justice Campbell’s admonition of the NSBS in Nova 
Scotia Barristers’ Society,75 the first Provincial Supreme Court decision 
on the matter relating to TWU’s proposed law school, suggests that 
any attempt by a law society to change the admissions policies of a law 
school would infringe on the jurisdiction of other regulatory bodies 
and would violate the independence law schools have traditionally 
enjoyed.76 Justice Campbell’s reasoning evinces a Tocquevillian belief 
in the importance of independent institutions that mediate between 
the individual and the government: 
The NSBS of course has no statutory authority to regulate a law 
school or university outside Nova Scotia or inside Nova Scotia for 
that matter. There are other regulators . . . who have the authority 
to determine how degree-granting institutions function . . . . An 
interpretation of the Legal Profession Act that supported NSBS 
general regulatory power over every law school in Canada would 
undoubtedly prompt a deluge of articles in learned legal journals in 
support of the traditional independence of those institutions.77 
The logic of Justice Campbell’s judgment implies that no law 
society has the right to refuse admission to individuals who have 
attended law schools that have enacted policies with which the law 
society disagrees. Not only would such a refusal infringe on the 
jurisdiction of other regulatory bodies, it would also impermissibly 
pressure certain law schools to change their policies and violate their 
“traditional independence.”78 
3. Religious freedom and community covenants 
Supposing that individual law societies do have jurisdiction to 
refuse admission to individuals based on where they received their law 
degree, could the exercise of such jurisdiction against a religiously 
 
 75. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25 (Can.). 
 76. Id. at para. 173. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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affiliated law school with a mandatory community covenant, such as 
the one involved in the TWU litigation, violate the school’s right to 
freedom of religion under the Charter? Because the law societies are 
likely considered to be state actors, the answer depends, in large part, 
on the interpretation of section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.79 Section 2(a) guarantees everyone the “freedom of 
conscience and religion.”80 The first case in which the Supreme Court 
interpreted section 2(a) was Big M Drug Mart,81 in which the Court 
provided a robust definition of the freedom of religion. The 
court held, 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to 
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means 
more than that.82 
As a result of this judgment, section 2(a) of the Charter is to be 
interpreted broadly and can be assumed to cover religiously 
affiliated schools. 
It might be argued that the act of conditioning the recognition of 
a school’s law degree on the removal of that school’s community 
covenant does not affect a religious belief or practice. According to 
this line of reasoning, unless it can be established that there is a tenet 
of the religion that requires the study of law to be done in the 
company of other people who comply with the covenant, there is no 
infringement of section 2(a) of the Charter. However, this argument 
is not grounded in law. 
In Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,83 the Court further interpreted 
section 2(a) to find that freedom of religion includes “the freedom to 
undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, 
in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is 
sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a 
 
 79. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 2, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 80. Id. 
 81. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.). 
 82. Id. at 336. 
 83. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.). 
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function of his or her spiritual faith.”84 Moreover, this freedom is not 
required to conform to an “official religious dogma or . . . the 
position of religious officials.”85 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not require a religious 
practice to conform to any set of doctrines or societal beliefs in order 
to receive protection. Therefore, if it can be established that (1) a 
community covenant has a nexus with religion and (2) individuals 
attending the school sincerely believe that studying in the company of 
those who comply with the community covenant is a function of their 
spiritual faith, then a law society’s refusal to recognize the law degree 
of such a school would violate that school’s religious freedom rights 
under the Charter. 
The above-mentioned test would ordinarily resolve the question 
as to whether the religious rights of an individual or entity have been 
infringed. However, section 1 of the Charter states that the freedoms 
guaranteed in the Charter are not absolute, but are “subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.”86 In the case of TWU’s 
proposed law school, the manner in which TWU exercises its right to 
freedom of religion may infringe on the fundamental right of equality, 
which is enshrined in section 15 of Canada’s Charter.87 Section 15 
holds that “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination.”88 According to critics of TWU, the 
discriminatory effect of TWU’s admissions policy violates section 15 
of the Charter and, as a result, the law societies are acting in 
accordance with section 1 of the Charter in restricting TWU’s right 
to freedom of religion. 
However, a hierarchical approach that advances certain rights over 
and above other rights is contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. In the event that religious freedom rights conflict with 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, the Supreme Court 
has adopted a balancing approach whereby religious rights are 
 
 84. Id. at 553. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 87. See id. at s 15. 
 88. Id. 
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“accommodate[d] and balance[d] . . . against other interests,”89 
according to the test articulated in Oakes.90 The Oakes test holds that 
the infringement of a fundamental right will be upheld only if it meets 
two criteria: “First, the objective [of the infringement] . . . must relate 
to societal concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society”;91 second, the party seeking to limit a fundamental 
right “must show the means to be . . . fair and not arbitrary, carefully 
designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally connected 
to that objective.”92 This includes an inquiry both into whether the 
means “impair the right in question as little as possible” and into 
whether there is “a proportionality between the effects of the limiting 
measure and the objective.”93 
Some scholars have maintained that the Canadian judiciary has not 
always properly balanced fundamental rights against the interest of 
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination. For example, Hans 
Clausen notes that the Canadian judiciary has failed to adequately 
protect the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and freedom of 
speech in situations in which anti-discriminatory interests are raised.94 
Similarly, Iain Benson notes that in the face of equality claims raised 
by gay rights proponents, many religious communities feel they “are 
often not being accorded the respect they deserve and to which they 
are entitled.”95 Thus, significant concerns have been raised regarding 
the application of the Oakes balancing test. 
In the realm of accreditation, however, the Oakes test has been 
employed in a manner favorable to the fundamental right to freedom 
of religion. The balancing approach articulated in Oakes was employed 
in British Columbia College of Teachers,96 which involved not only the 
same school, but also legal issues similar to those in the present 
controversy. In this latter case, the BCCT refused to certify teachers 
 
 89. R. v. N.S., [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726, para. 54 (Can.). 
 90. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.). 
 91. Id. at 105. 
 92. Id. at 106. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Hans C. Clausen, Note, The “Privilege of Speech” in a “Pleasantly Authoritarian 
Country”: How Canada’s Judiciary Allowed Laws Proscribing Discourse Critical of Homosexuality 
to Trump Free Speech and Religious Liberty, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 486–500 (2005). 
 95. Iain T. Benson, The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV.111, 151 (2007). 
 96. See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
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from TWU’s education program over concerns that these teachers 
would act in an intolerant manner while teaching in the public school 
system.97 The fear was that teachers trained at TWU would act in a 
discriminatory fashion against homosexual students98 in contravention 
of the equality provisions of section 15 of the Charter.99 
The British Columbia College of Teachers Court sought to balance 
the right of TWU students to receive their teaching degree from a 
religiously affiliated university “with the equality concerns of students 
in BC’s public school system”100 in light of Canada’s commitment to 
pluralism.101 Indeed, the Court noted that “[t]he diversity of Canadian 
society is partly reflected in the multiple religious organizations that 
mark the societal landscape and this diversity of views should be 
respected.”102 The proper balance, the Court held, lay in favor of 
allowing TWU students to receive their teaching degrees from a 
religiously affiliated university because the BCCT’s infringement of 
TWU’s right to freedom of religion was not factually related to its 
concerns about discriminatory practices in the public school system.103 
Indeed, the BCCT had provided no evidence that graduates from 
TWU’s program would act intolerantly.104 The Court concluded that 
the “tolerance of divergent beliefs is a hallmark of a democratic 
society.”105 Thus, the British Columbia College of Teachers case implies 
that under a proper balancing of sections 2(a) and 15(1) of the 
Charter, accrediting agencies are not permitted to deny graduates of 
a religious institution the opportunity to practice their trade on the 
mere speculation that they may engage in a discriminatory manner. 
While the legal issues in the British Columbia College of Teachers 
case are similar to those in the present controversy, they are 
 
 97. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 786, 799–
801 (Can.). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), states: “Every 
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination.” 
 100. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 810. 
 101. Id. at 800. 
 102. Id. at 812. 
 103. Id. at 814. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 815. 
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distinguishable. As a result, the British Columbia College of Teachers 
case is not conclusively binding on the present case. In the latter, the 
law societies do not claim that TWU graduates would act in a 
discriminatory fashion; rather, they state that by recognizing the law 
degrees conferred by TWU, they would be endorsing or condoning 
TWU’s discriminatory action, a claim that was not raised in the British 
Columbia College of Teachers litigation. Thus, in the present 
controversy, the right to freedom of religion needs to be balanced 
against the law society’s legislative objective of 
combating discrimination. 
In Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society,106 Justice Campbell recognized 
that the NSBS’s objective of combating discrimination and 
encouraging “diversity in the legal profession [was] a pressing and 
substantial purpose.”107 However, Justice Campbell held that the 
NSBS’s refusal to recognize TWU’s degree was not rationally related 
to its objective, as the graduates of the proposed law school would 
only have a negligible impact on the legal profession in Nova Scotia.108 
Campbell maintained that “[i]t is a stretch to speculate that [this 
measure] . . . will help to improve the proportion of 
LGBT lawyers.”109  
Furthermore, the measure adopted by NSBS “was not designed to 
minimally impair” TWU’s rights to religious freedom.110 While the 
NSBS did not require TWU to remove its Community Covenant in its 
entirety, but sought only to free law students from the obligation to 
abide by the Covenant,111 Justice Campbell noted that this “effort only 
points to the illogic of the position.”112 The NSBS ostensibly attempted 
to avoid the appearance of hypocrisy that attaches to condoning a 
discriminatory law school while advocating for equal rights. However, 
the appearance of hypocrisy is not diminished if the law students are 
“being taught by professors, surrounded by other students, and subject 
 
 106. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25 (Can.). 
 107. Id. at para. 241. 
 108. Id. at para. 247. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at para. 266. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at para. 267. 
1.BOERSMA.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2016  2:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1104 
to administrators, who would be subject to what [the NSBS] considers 
to be unlawfully discriminatory treatment.”113  
Lastly, in his analysis of the proportionality of the effects of the 
NSBS’s decision to its objective, Justice Campbell found that the 
NSBS’s decision had a direct impact upon TWU’s religious freedom 
and that it did “nothing whatsoever to improve the status of LGBT 
people in [Nova Scotia].”114 As a result, Justice Campbell found that 
a proper balancing of TWU’s religious freedom rights with the NSBS’s 
principled opposition to discrimination weighed in favor of TWU’s 
religious freedom rights.115 
The balancing approach employed by both Justice Campbell and 
the Supreme Court in the British Columbia College of Teachers case 
have the benefit of maintaining the pluralism and multiculturalism 
required by section 27 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 
27 implicitly endorses the Tocquevillian recognition of the importance 
of diversity and pluralism in liberal democracies: the “Charter shall be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and 
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”116 A number 
of Supreme Court cases have recognized that religious diversity is a 
significant component of multi-culturalism, and have built upon 
section 27’s Tocquevillian implications. For example, in Big M Drug 
Mart, in which the Court struck down provincial legislation 
mandating a universal observance of a day of rest, the Court held that 
“[t]he power to compel, on religious grounds, the universal 
observance of the day of rest preferred by one religion is not consistent 
with the preservation and enhancement of the multi-cultural heritage 
of Canadians recognized in [section] 27 of the Charter”117 and that 
the purpose of the Charter is to “safeguard[ ] religious minorities from 
the threat of ‘the tyranny of the majority.’”118 The balancing analyses 
conducted by the Supreme Court in the British Columbia College of 
Teachers case and by Justice Campbell comport with this interpretation 
of section 27 of the Charter. By providing a space for the flourishing 
of a plurality of religious schools, these balancing analyses enhance 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at para. 269. 
 115. Id. at para. 270. 
 116. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 27, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 117. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 297 (Can.) 
 118. Id. at 337. 
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Canada’s multi-cultural heritage and safeguard religious minorities 
from the tyranny of the majority. 
As the above analysis indicates, religiously affiliated law schools in 
Canada should not be denied accreditation due to the discriminatory 
effects of their admissions policies. Indeed, the FLSC’s guidelines 
dictate that it will not inquire into either the admissions practices of 
law schools or the philosophical principles undergirding the 
approaches to teaching law taken by various law schools. Furthermore, 
as a matter of Canadian law, as long as a religiously affiliated law 
school’s discriminatory admissions policy has a nexus with religion, 
and as long as the admissions policy is sincerely believed to be a 
function of spiritual growth, it receives protection from section 2(a) 
of the Charter. While section 1 of the Charter indicates that this right 
is not absolute, any attempt to limit this right must (1) be pressing 
and substantial and (2) only minimally impair the right. As a result, 
religiously affiliated law schools should not be denied accreditation on 
the basis of their admissions policies. 
4. Current legal battles 
Justice Campbell’s decision in Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society 
elucidates many of the legal issues surrounding TWU’s proposed law 
school. However, his decision is far from the final word on the topic. 
While Justice Campbell’s decision stands in Nova Scotia,119 TWU’s 
challenges to both the LSBC and the LSUC decisions to deny 
accreditation to its proposed law school are ongoing.120 
TWU’s challenge of the LSBC decision involved somewhat 
different factual issues from the case brought against the NSBS, as the 
LSBC had originally granted accreditation to TWU’s proposed school 
of law but afterwards reversed that decision following a referendum 
by the society’s members.121 The British Columbia Supreme Court not 
 
 119. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, Update on the Trinity Western University Matter (Aug. 15, 
2016), http://nsbs.org/news/2016/08/update-trinity-western-university-matter. 
 120. Law Soc’y of B.C. v. Trinity W. Univ., No. CA43367 (Can. B.C.C.A. argued June 1–
3, 2016); Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2016] ONCA 518 (Can.) (dismissing 
the appeal); Trinity W. Univ., TWU to go Back to Court after Negative Ruling from Ontario 
Court of Appeal (June 30, 2016, 9:52 AM), http://twu.ca/news/2016/048-ontario-appeal-
decision.html (“[Trinity Western University] will take the Ontario decision to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.”). 
 121. Trinity W. Univ v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [2015] BCSC 2326, para. 48 (Can.). 
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only held that the LSBC improperly delegated the decision to its 
members,122 but also held that the decision infringed on TWU’s 
religious freedom.123 As a result, the British Columbia Supreme Court 
reinstated the LSBC’s original decision.124 In response, the LSBC filed 
an appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which affirmed 
the lower court’s decision.125 The court noted that its decision rested, 
in part, on the importance of pluralism in a liberal 
democratic society.126 
The Ontario Divisional Court, which heard TWU’s challenge of 
the LSUC’s denial of accreditation, found that while the LSUC did 
infringe on TWU’s religious freedom rights, a proper balancing of 
religious freedom and the LSUC’s commitment to combating 
discrimination weighed in favor of the LSUC’s decision to deny 
accreditation.127 Indeed, the Court noted that the LSUC’s decision 
“does not, in fact, preclude TWU from opening a law school” but 
merely denies accreditation to TWU.128 The fact that TWU would be 
financially prohibited from opening its law school without 
accreditation from the LSUC was inconsequential to the Court, as 
that position would be using freedom of religion “as a mechanism to 
compel state support.”129 
In response to this decision, TWU filed an appeal to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal.130 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding 
that the LSUC “has an obligation to govern the legal profession in 
the public interest”131 and that the LSUC’s consideration of the 
discriminatory effects of TWU’s admissions policies was warranted.132 
Furthermore, it held that the LSUC had engaged in a proper 
balancing of TWU’s religious freedom rights and the equality rights 
 
 122. Id. at para. 152. 
 123. Id. at para. 138. 
 124. Id. at para. 156. 
 125. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [2016] BCCA 423, para. 190–94 (Can.). 
 126. Id. at para. 186–87. 
 127. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] ONSC 4250, para. 124 (Can.). 
 128. Id. at para. 120. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., Trinity Western University (TWU) Accreditation, 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 131. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2016] ONCA 518, para. 108 (Can.). 
 132. Id. at para. 112. 
1.BOERSMA.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2016  2:41 PM 
1081 The Accreditation of Religious Law Schools 
 1107 
of the LGBT community.133 Specifically, the Court of Appeal noted 
that the decision was proper on the basis of four reasons: (1) the 
LSUC act as gatekeepers that have a role in “ensuring equality of 
admission to the legal profession”134; (2) “the LSUC could attach 
weight to its obligations under [section] 6 of the [Human Rights 
Code]”, which provides every person with “equal treatment with 
respect to membership in any . . . self-governing profession without 
discrimination”135; (3) there is a distinction to be made “when a 
religious institution and its members seek to exercise their religious 
beliefs in a manner that discriminates against others”136; and (4) the 
LSUC’s decision was in accordance with international law.137 The 
court concluded on the basis of these reasons that the LSUC had 
engaged in a proper balancing of the right to religious freedom and 
the right to equality.138 
However, the reasons articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
do not warrant the conclusion that a proper balancing of the right to 
religious freedom and the right to equality weigh in favor of upholding 
the LSUC’s decision to deny accreditation to TWU. Rather, all the 
reasons listed by the Court of Appeal merely suggest that a balancing 
approach is required. For example, the court’s assertion that the law 
societies, as the gatekeepers to entry of the legal profession, have a 
role “in ensuring equality of admission to the legal profession,”139 
neither supports nor undermines the LSUC’s decision. Rather, it 
simply suggests that the LSUC has to ensure equality of admission to 
both LGBT individuals and to graduates of TWU’s proposed 
program. By refusing to allow TWU graduates to practice based on 
the speculation that this would have a negative effect on the population 
of LGBT lawyers, the LSUC is inflicting an actual negative effect 
on TWU.140 
 
 133. Id. at para. 129 
 134. Id. at para. 132. 
 135. Id. at para. 133. 
 136. Id. at para. 134. 
 137. Id. at para. 139–40. 
 138. Id. at para. 143. 
 139. Id. at para. 132. 
 140. The Ontario Court of Appeal applies the same faulty logic in the other three reasons 
listed in support of the LSUC’s balancing approach. The second reason listed in support of the 
LSUC’s balancing approach is that  
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, it is likely that the 
Supreme Court will find, as have all the courts that have thus far 
analyzed the issue, that TWU’s religious freedom rights were 
infringed. While religious freedom rights are not absolute and may be 
subject to limitations, the Supreme Court will likely find—if previous 
jurisprudence is properly taken into account—that the blanket refusal 
to recognize graduates from TWU’s proposed school of law is 
disproportionate.141 While the negative effects of the accreditation of 
TWU on the population of LGBT lawyers in any particular province 
is speculative, the refusal to accredit TWU would have an actual and 
direct effect on TWU’s ability to establish a law school. As a result, 
the Supreme Court of Canada will likely find that a proper balancing 
of the right to religious freedom and the right to equality weighs in 
favor of TWU. 
 
in balancing the various rights at issue, the LSUC could attach weight to its 
obligations under s. 6 of the HRC, which provides: “Every person has a right to equal 
treatment with respect to membership in any trade union, trade or occupational 
association or self-governing profession without discrimination because of race, 
ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or 
disability.” [Emphasis added.]. 
Id. at para. 133. However, because section 6 of the HRC provides for equal treatment without 
discrimination based on both sexual orientation and creed, the LSUC’s obligations under this 
legislation neither support nor undermine the LSUC’s decision. The third reason listed in 
support of the LSUC’s balancing approach is that “there is an important distinction to be made 
when a religious institution and its members seek to exercise their religious beliefs in a manner 
that discriminates against others.” Id. at para. 134. Of course, this merely suggests that a 
balancing approach is required and, as a result, it also neither supports nor undermines the 
LSUC’s decision. The last reason articulated by the Court in favor of the LSUC’s balancing 
approach is that the LSUC’s approach takes into account international human rights law and 
“international treaties and other documents that bind Canada.” Id. at para. 139. Specifically, the 
Court noted that “Article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 
Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.Y.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976, provides: ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.’ 
[Emphasis added.].” Id. The Court concludes that “the LSUC’s balancing in its accreditation 
decision was faithful to this article of an important international law document to which Canada 
is a signatory.” Id. at para. 140. This international treaty, however, has no bearing on whether 
the balancing approach employed by the LSUC was proper. Rather, it merely suggests that a 
balancing approach is required. 
 141. See Clausen, supra note 94, at 443, for an argument suggesting that Canada’s 
judiciary seeks to promote homosexual acceptance in Canadian culture and that this has had, 
and will continue to have, troubling implications for the right to freedom of speech and the right 
to freedom of religion in Canada. 
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B. Legal Analysis Under American Law 
American jurisprudence provides for a robust protection of the 
right to religious freedom. This section will begin by identifying the 
political and administrative actors involved in the regulation of legal 
education and the requirements a law school must meet in order to 
receive accreditation in the United States. As will be made clear, the 
extent to which a religious law school is able to reflect its religious 
affiliation by way of mandatory honor codes is dependent both on the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and on federal and 
state legislation. This section will then analyze the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence and conclude that religious law 
schools are able to enact mandatory honor codes that run afoul of 
neutrally phrased anti-discrimination legislation. The basis of religious 
law schools’ exemption from such legislation is the hybrid right 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith. This hybrid right consists of both the right to 
freedom of religion and the right to freedom of association. This 
section will conclude with a brief discussion of the current status of 
the legal realm vis à vis religious freedom and homosexual rights. 
1. ABA requirements for admitting law schools 
In America, the United States Department of Education has 
approved the Council of the Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar (the Council) of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) as the “recognized national agency for the accreditation of 
programs leading to the J.D. degree.”142 While it is up to the various 
states to determine what requirements are necessary for an individual 
to sit for the state bar exam, “[a]lmost all rely exclusively on ABA 
approval of a law school to determine whether the jurisdiction’s legal 
education requirement for admission to the bar is satisfied.”143 Thus, 
the ABA has significant power in determining the ability of individuals 
to be admitted to the various state bars. 
As noted, the ABA’s practice of accrediting law schools is 
governed by the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval 
of Law Schools. This handbook lists the “requirements a law school 
 
 142. A.B.A. Standards, supra note 22, at v. 
 143. Id. 
1.BOERSMA.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2016  2:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1110 
must meet to obtain and retain ABA approval.”144 In contrast to the 
FLSC, the handbook maintains that the ABA does inquire into the 
admissions aspects of law schools in its accreditation procedures.145 
Indeed, ABA Standard 205(a) mandates that “[a] law school shall not 
use admission policies or take other action to preclude admission of 
applicants or retention of students on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age or disability.”146 The 
question of whether this standard violates religious freedom rights was 
first raised in Oral Roberts University.147 In Oral Roberts, Oral Roberts 
University (ORU) sought to establish a law school, but was denied 
accreditation by the ABA because it “required all entering students to 
sign a pledge regarding their commitment to Christian religious 
beliefs.”148 According to the ABA, the ORU admissions policy violated 
the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 
as it denied admission to ORU based on religious beliefs.149 ORU 
brought suit maintaining that this violated their First Amendment 
Rights.150 The issue of whether Standard 211(b)151 violated ORU’s 
religious freedom rights, however, was never settled as ORU 
voluntarily dismissed the complaint after the ABA granted it 
provisional accreditation.152 
As a result of the ORU controversy, the ABA amended the 
Standards to include what is currently known as Standard 205(c).153 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at ch. 2, stand. 205(a). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Oral Roberts Univ. v. ABA, No. 81 C 3171, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18628 (N.D. Ill. 
July 17, 1981). 
 148. BOYD, supra note 35, at 108. 
 149. Id. at 107–08. 
 150. Id. at 108; see also Destro, supra note 1, at 446–49 (discussing the Oral Roberts 
University controversy and noting that ORU and the ABA have different understandings of the 
term “diversity”). 
 151. In previous editions of the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for the Approval of 
Law Schools, the substantive contents of Standard 205 were listed as Standard 211. The 
provisions of Standard 211 remain identical in the current edition of the ABA Standards, with 
the exception that subsections (a) and (b) have been listed in reverse order. Thus Standard 
211(b) of the previous editions of the ABA Standards are, under the current edition, listed as 
Standard 205(a). 
 152. Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously Affiliated 
American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1859, 1861 n.5 (1993). 
 153. BOYD, supra note 35, at 109. 
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Standard 205(c) states that “[t]his Standard does not prevent a law 
school from having a religious affiliation or purpose and adopting and 
applying policies of admission of students . . . that directly relate to 
this affiliation or purpose.”154 Standard 205(c) continues with the 
somewhat opaque statement that 
[t]hese [admissions] policies may provide a preference for persons 
adhering to the religious affiliation or purpose of the law school, but 
may not be applied to use admission policies or take other action to 
preclude admission of applicants or retention of students on the basis 
of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
age, or disability.155 
As Douglas Laycock has noted, Standard 211(c), which is now 
known as Standard 205(c), seems to state contradictorily that while 
law schools may have an admissions policy that prefers applicants who 
adhere to the religious affiliation of the school, they may not use such 
an admissions policy to preclude admission of applicants based on 
religion.156 Perhaps in recognition of this apparent contradiction, the 
ABA ends this Standard by deferring to the Constitution: “[R]eligious 
affiliation or purpose policies as to admission” are permitted “only to 
the extent that these policies are protected by the United States 
Constitution. It is administered as though the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution governs its application.”157 In sum, the ABA 
defers to First Amendment jurisprudence in determining whether a law 
school with an admissions policy based on religious affiliation will 
be accredited.158 
 
 154. A.B.A. Standards, supra note 22, at ch. 2, stand. 205(c). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Douglas Laycock, Academic Freedom, Religious Commitment, and Religious Integrity, 
78 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 302–03 (1995) (describing Standard 211(c) as a “circumlocution” and 
suggesting that this circumlocution means that a religious law school “can maintain a critical 
mass of students and faculty of [its] own faith, but [it] cannot insist on a faculty or a student 
body that is entirely of [its] own faith”). 
 157. A.B.A. Standards, supra note 22, at ch. 2, stand. 205(c). 
 158. Whether the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence applies irrespective of 
ABA Standard 205(c) depends on the status of the ABA as a state actor. Despite the fact that the 
ABA has been approved by the Department of Education as the national agency responsible for 
accrediting law schools, the ABA may not be a state actor and, consequently, would be free from 
complying with constitutional provisions. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. 179, 194 (1988) (holding that although a State Supreme Court might enforce rules that 
it has “adopted in toto from the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility[,] 
[i]t does not follow . . . that the ABA’s formulation of those disciplinary rules was state action”); 
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2. First amendment and honor codes 
Whether the ABA is able to use its power to deny accreditation to 
religiously affiliated law schools that have discriminatory admissions 
policies depends largely, although not exclusively, on the manner in 
which the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment. The 
relevant First Amendment jurisprudence begins with Smith.159 At issue 
in Smith was whether or not plaintiffs ought to be granted a religious 
exemption from a general criminal prohibition of drug use.160 
According to the plaintiffs, who had ingested peyote “for sacramental 
purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church,”161 the State 
of Oregon’s inclusion of “religiously inspired peyote use within . . . its 
general criminal prohibition . . . of that drug”162 violated their First 
Amendment free exercise rights.163 
The plaintiffs put forward two arguments. First, they argued that 
“‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ includes requiring any 
individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) 
the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires).”164 
In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that the “claim for a religious 
exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner.”165 The Court rejected both arguments.166 
In response to the first argument, the Court held that a free 
exercise claim on its own was insufficient to place an individual beyond 
a neutral, generally applicable law. While free exercise claims had, in 
the past, required the state to provide an exemption, these claims had 
always taken the form of “hybrid claims,” or claims involving the “Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, 
 
see also Hu v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 334 F. App’x 17, 19 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ABA is not 
a state actor because the State Supreme Court, not the ABA, “[d]ecides whether graduation 
from an ABA-accredited school is necessary to practice law in Illinois”). Whether the ABA is a 
state actor is, however, largely moot for the purposes of this Article, as the ABA has stipulated 
that the First Amendment governs the application of Standard 205(c). 
 159. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 160. Id. at 874. 
 161. Id. at 872. 
 162. Id. at 874. 
 163. Id. at 878. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 882–83. 
 166. Id. at 878, 882–85. 
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such as freedom of speech and of the press.”167 As a result, a free 
exercise claim raised in response to a neutral, generally applicable law, 
such as the one in Smith, was held to be insufficient to require the 
State to provide an exemption.168 
The Court similarly rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the statute 
be evaluated under the strict scrutiny test articulated in Sherbert v. 
Verner.169 In Sherbert, the Court had held that “governmental actions 
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest.”170 The Supreme Court refused to 
apply the Sherbert test to the facts of the Smith case.171 Instead, the 
Court held the Sherbert test to be applicable only in cases involving 
unemployment compensation and not in cases involving “generally 
applicable criminal law[s].”172 As a result, the plaintiffs in Smith were 
not entitled to an exemption.173 After Smith, the general rule is that 
the First Amendment no longer requires government actors to grant 
exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws to individuals 
whose free exercise of religion is inhibited by such laws. 
Smith may have implications for religiously affiliated law schools 
in the United States. Indeed, seven such law schools have community 
covenants similar to the one TWU requires its students to sign.174 For 
 
 167. Id. at 881 (citations omitted). 
 168. Id. at 890. 
 169. Id. at 885. 
 170. Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963)). 
 171. Id. at 883–84. 
 172. Id. at 884. 
 173. Id. at 890. 
 174. Bos. Coll., 2016–2017 Student Guide, § 4.6.8, 
http://www.bc.edu/publications/studentguide/behavioralpolicies.html (last updated Aug. 29, 
2016) (“All students have a responsibility to respect the values and traditions of Boston College 
as a Jesuit, Catholic institution, including adhering to the Church’s teachings with respect to 
sexual activity.”); BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM HONOR CODE 3 
(2015), https://policy.byu.edu/content/managed/26/ChurchEducationalSystemHonor
Code.pdf (“Homosexual behavior is inappropriate and violates the Honor Code. Homosexual 
behavior includes not only sexual relations between members of the same sex, but all forms of 
physical intimacy that give expression to homosexual feelings.”); Catholic Univ. of Am., Code of 
Student Conduct § III(R)(1) (June 23, 2015), http://policies.cua.edu/studentlife/
studentconduct/conduct-full.cfm (“Sexual acts of any kind outside the confines of marriage are 
contrary to the teachings and moral values of the Catholic Church and are prohibited. The 
University affirms that sexual relationships are designed by God to be expressed solely within a 
marriage between husband and wife.”); LIBERTY UNIV., THE LIBERTY WAY 11, 
https://www.liberty.edu/media/1210/Student_Honor_Code.pdf (“Sexual relations outside 
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example, Boston College has a code of conduct that states that 
“incidents of sexual intercourse outside the bonds of matrimony may 
be referred to the Student Conduct System.”175 More pointedly, the 
honor code at Brigham Young University’s law school states that 
“[h]omosexual behavior is inappropriate and violates the Honor 
Code.”176 In the event that a state passes a neutral, generally applicable 
statute aimed at eradicating discrimination, would a religious law 
school that has chosen to enact such a code of conduct be exempt 
from complying with such legislation? Put another way, can the ABA 
refuse to accredit a religiously affiliated school because of the 
discriminatory effects of its code of conduct without infringing on that 
school’s free exercise rights? 
The general rule articulated in Smith seems to work to the 
disadvantage of religiously affiliated law schools. As noted, in Smith 
the Court found the Sherbert balancing test to be inapplicable to 
neutral, generally applicable laws.177 As a result, in the event that a state 
were to enact anti-discrimination legislation aimed at ensuring that 
private actors accord homosexuals equal treatment, Smith seems to 
provide little protection for religiously affiliated law schools that have 
chosen to reflect their religious purposes in their admissions policies. 
Thus, it seems that unless the state legislature has chosen to grant an 
exemption, a religiously affiliated law school would be required to 
comply with such anti-discrimination statutes. 
 
of a biblically ordained marriage between a natural-born man and a natural-born woman are not 
permissible at Liberty University. In personal relationships, students are encouraged to know 
and abide by common-sense guidelines to avoid the appearance of impropriety.”); MISS. COLL., 
STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 10 (2016–2017), 
https://www.mc.edu/tomahawk/files/2314/7189/1885/Mississippi_College_Student_Cod
e_of_Conduct_2016-2017.pdf (defining sexual impropriety to include “participation in, 
advocacy for, or appearance of engaging in premarital sex, extramarital sex, or homosexual 
activities, or other sexual expression that may conflict with the Christian identity or faith mission 
of Mississippi College”); Pepperdine Univ., Sexual Relationships, under Student Policies and 
Procedures, http://www.pepperdine.edu/admission/student-life/policies/policies-and-proce
dures.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (“[A]ffirm[ing] that sexual relationships are designed by 
God to be expressed solely within a marriage between husband and wife”); REGENT UNIV., 
STUDENT HANDBOOK § 2.3.4.2.2 (2016), http://www.regent.edu/admin/stusrv/
docs/StudentHandbook.pdf (prohibiting “disorderly conduct or lewd, indecent, or obscene 
conduct or expression, involvement with pornography, premarital sex, adultery, homosexual 
conduct or any other conduct that violates Biblical standards”). 
 175. Bos. Coll., supra note 174, at § 4.6.8. 
 176. BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., supra note 174, at 3. 
 177. See supra note 172. 
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Despite the Court’s decision in Smith, there are two avenues by 
which a religious law school may be able to subject an anti-
discrimination statute to strict scrutiny in the hopes of receiving a 
religious exemption from such a statute. The first is by way of the 
various Restoration of Religious Freedom Acts (RFRAs) that have 
been enacted at the federal and state level. The effect of these pieces 
of legislation has been “to restore the compelling interest test” 
articulated in Sherbert and “to guarantee its application in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”178 Currently, 
both the federal government and twenty-one states have RFRAs.179 
Thus, it is possible that religiously affiliated law schools’ accreditation 
status is protected by either the RFRA legislation enacted at the federal 
level or by the RFRA legislation of the state in which they 
are located.180 
The second way a religious law school could challenge a neutral 
anti-discrimination statute is by way of the Smith decision itself. As 
may be recalled, in Smith the plaintiffs’ primary contention was that 
the right to free exercise includes the right to be exempt from a 
 
 178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994). 
 179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb4 (1994); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 (amended 1999); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-402 (2015); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 52-571b (1993); FLA. STAT. § 761.01–.05 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (2000); 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1–/30 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5301 to -5305 (2013); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231–:5242 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 11-61-1 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1 to -5 (2000); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251–258. (2000); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2401–2407 (2002); 42 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 42-80.1-1 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-10 to -60 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-
1-407 (2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 
to -2.1 (2007). 
 180. Whether Federal or State RFRAs protect the accreditation status of religious law 
schools from action taken by the ABA depends on whether the ABA is considered a state actor. 
See supra note 158. In addition, should the ABA be considered to be a state actor, the question 
of whether the Federal or State RFRA governs will depend on whether the ABA is a Federal 
government actor or a State government actor. On the one hand, the fact that the rules for 
admission to the practice of law are a matter of state concern suggests that the ABA is a State 
government actor. On the other hand, both the fact that the federal government has recognized 
the ABA as the national organization for the accreditation of law schools, as well as the fact that 
a law school’s receipt of certain federal funds is contingent on ABA accreditation, suggests that 
the ABA is a Federal government actor. Of the seven American law schools that have honor 
codes or admissions policies that could potentially be found to be in contravention of state anti-
discrimination legislation, three (Columbus Law School, Pepperdine University School of Law, 
and J. Reuben Clark Law School) are located in jurisdictions that do not have State 
RFRA legislation. 
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“generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of 
an act” that is forbidden (or required) by one’s religious belief.181 
According to this claim, an exemption from a generally applicable law 
is required when such a law compels individuals to act in a manner 
contrary to their religious beliefs. While it is true that the Court 
rejected this claim as applied to the facts in Smith, the Court 
nevertheless indicated that when combined with other constitutional 
protections, such as the “freedom of speech and of the press, or the 
rights of parents . . . to direct the education of their children,”182 the 
right to the free exercise of religion would need to be analyzed under 
the Sherbert balancing test. 
Furthermore, the Court speculated, without deciding, that the 
free exercise of religion would be as expansive as the plaintiffs claimed 
when combined with the freedom of association. Indeed, the Court 
stated, “[I]t is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom 
of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise 
Clause concerns.”183 Thus, when combined with a freedom of 
association claim, a free exercise claim would likely constitute a hybrid 
right that is guaranteed an exemption from a neutral, generally 
applicable statute, absent a compelling state interest. Because the 
admissions policies of religiously affiliated law schools necessarily 
involve the right to association, it is likely that such a law school would 
be protected by the combination of the Free Exercise Clause and the 
right to freedom of association. 
A number of circuit courts have addressed hybrid rights claims, 
and a majority of these courts have found that when a free exercise 
claim is raised in conjunction with another claim, these claims do give 
rise to a hybrid right that is entitled to a higher standard of review.184 
 
 181. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
 182. Id. at 881 (citations omitted). 
 183. Id. at 882. 
 184. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson v. 
Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of 
Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In contrast, a minority of circuit courts have held that the 
Court’s discussion of hybrid rights in Smith is simply dicta. See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Kissinger v. Bd. of Tr. of the 
Ohio State Univ. Coll. of Vet. Med., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993). The minority position, 
however, is at odds with the reasoning provided in Smith. The Smith Court distinguished itself 
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The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have articulated the standard that ought 
to be employed in assessing whether a piece of legislation should be 
subjected to a heightened standard of review. Specifically, the Tenth 
Circuit has stated that the hybrid rights theory requires a free exercise 
claim to be raised in conjunction with “a colorable showing of 
infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights.”185 The 
Ninth Circuit has clarified that a colorable claim is one that has “a ‘fair 
probability’ or a ‘likelihood,’ but not a certitude, of success on the 
merits.”186 According to the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff cannot “allege 
a hybrid-rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny analysis merely by 
combining a free exercise claim with an utterly meritless claim of the 
violation of another alleged fundamental right.”187 Thus, the hybrid 
rights theory requires that in order to subject a neutral, generally 
applicable law to strict scrutiny, one ought to raise both a free exercise 
claim as well as another constitutional claim that has a reasonable 
chance of success on the merits. 
In the event that a state passed a neutral, generally applicable anti-
discrimination statute aimed at ensuring that all private actors accord 
citizens equal treatment, regardless of sexual orientation, Smith 
suggests that a religiously affiliated law school would be able to seek 
an exemption. This exemption would be based on a hybrid right 
consisting of the right to freedom of association and the right to the 
free exercise of religion. As will be made clear, granting religious law 
schools such an exemption would serve to encourage the viewpoint 
pluralism Tocqueville saw as crucial to liberal democracy. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Dale188 suggests that the right to 
freedom of association would present a religious law school with, at 
 
from previous cases in which strict scrutiny had applied, noting that the previous cases had 
involved the Free Exercise Clause “in conjunction with other constitutional protections.” Smith, 
494 U.S. at 881. The fact that the Court distinguished these previous cases rather than simply 
overruling them suggests that they are still good law and that it is the hybrid rights theory that 
makes them such. Furthermore, since the Smith case, the Court has referenced the hybrid rights 
theory approvingly in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Thus, Supreme Court 
precedent suggests that the approach adopted by the majority of the circuit courts is the 
correct approach. 
 185. Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700. 
 186. Miller, 176 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 
F.3d 692, 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 187. Id. at 1208. 
 188. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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the very least, a colorable claim (a claim with a reasonable chance of 
success on the merits) to an exemption from a neutral, generally 
applicable anti-discrimination statute.189 In Dale, the Court held that 
the Boy Scouts of America were exempt from a state statute that had 
the effect of requiring them to accept an openly homosexual individual 
as an assistant scoutmaster.190 According to the Court, the Boy Scouts 
were exempt from this public accommodations statute because it met 
two requirements: (1) it was a group engaged in expressive 
association; and (2) the forced inclusion of the respondent “would 
significantly affect the [group’s] ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”191 The Court adopted a Tocquevillian stance in its 
position, noting that the fact that “homosexuality has gained greater 
societal acceptance” was no reason to “deny[] First Amendment 
protection to those who refuse to accept those views.”192 Indeed, the 
Court stated that “the fact that an idea may be embraced and 
advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more reason to 
protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a 
different view.”193 Thus, the Court recognized, in accordance with 
Tocqueville, both the value of pluralism and the dangers posed by the 
tyranny of the majority. 
A religious law school that seeks to ensure that its students abide 
by certain moral stipulations would likely meet the two requirements 
listed in Dale. According to Dale, “[A]n association that seeks to 
transmit . . . a system of values engages in expressive activity.”194 Thus, 
provided the law school had a stated goal of educating its students in 
accordance with certain values or religious tenets, it would be 
considered to be engaging in expressive association.195 Furthermore, 
 
 189. Id. at 656. The Court found the Boy Scouts of America to be an expressive association 
entitled to First Amendment protection despite the fact that it “does not revoke the membership 
of heterosexual Scout leaders that openly disagree with the Boy Scouts’ policy on sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 655. This suggests that a religious law school requiring its members to adhere 
to certain religious tenets would almost certainly be entitled to First Amendment protection 
as well. 
 190. Id. at 659. 
 191. Id. at 650. 
 192. Id. at 660. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 650. 
 195. See Gerdy, supra note 20, at 978–79 (“[T]o law professors and law students of faith, 
their religious belief and commitments are connected to everything else that they do . . . . [Law 
schools] are at least as expressive as that of the Boy Scouts . . . .”). 
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Dale holds that the inclusion of individuals that openly disagree with 
an organization’s system of values would impair that organization’s 
ability to advocate private or public viewpoints. In the event that an 
individual openly disagrees with a religious law school’s moral 
stipulations, including stipulations regarding sexual conduct, the 
forced inclusion of such an individual would likely be found to affect 
the school’s ability to advocate its viewpoints. Lastly, a religious law 
school would contribute to viewpoint diversity, which, as noted, the 
Court saw as an important contributing factor to its decision in Dale. 
As a result, religious law schools would likely be exempt from any anti-
discrimination statutes such as the one at issue in Dale. 
However, a religiously affiliated law school would not be required 
to prevail on the grounds of freedom of association alone. Rather, so 
long as there is a colorable claim to freedom of association, such a law 
school would be able to raise a hybrid rights claim comprising both 
the colorable freedom of association claim and a free exercise claim. 
Such a hybrid rights claim would be analyzed under the strict scrutiny 
standard that existed prior to Smith. The mechanical operations of this 
standard are identical to the standard articulated in both Sherbert and 
in the federal RFRA legislation, which, as noted,196 was passed by 
Congress after the Smith decision in order to restore the strict scrutiny 
standard that had existed prior to Smith. 
According to the strict scrutiny standard articulated in both 
Sherbert and RFRA, a neutral, generally applicable law that infringes 
upon an individual’s free exercise rights197 will survive a free exercise 
 
 196. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 197. Some judicial decisions have suggested that the Sherbert balancing test is inapplicable 
as applied to organizations because the free exercise of religion is fundamentally an individual 
right. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to 
secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.” 
(citations omitted)). We need not, however, resolve the ambiguity surrounding organizational 
rights to determine that the Sherbert balancing test is applicable as applied to organizations when 
a hybrid rights claim has been raised. In its articulation of the hybrid rights claim in Smith, the 
Court referenced Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Society of Sisters, 
a corporation, challenged the constitutionality of the Compulsory Education Act, which 
“require[d] every parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of a 
child between eight and sixteen years to send him to a public school.” Id. at 530 (alteration in 
original). The Court held that despite the fact that, as a corporation, the Society of Sisters could 
not claim that its constitutional rights were being infringed, it could, nevertheless, seek 
“protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with [its] patrons and the 
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challenge only if it is “justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the 
regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate.’”198 This raises the question as to whether the effect of the 
anti-discrimination statute would infringe on a law school’s free 
exercise of religion, and whether such an infringement might be 
justified by a compelling state interest. 
In Sherbert, the Court held that state action that forces an 
individual to choose between forfeiting a state-provided benefit, on 
the one hand, and abandoning one’s religious precepts, on the other 
hand, constitutes a burden on the free exercise of religion.199 In light 
of the Court’s unfavorable view of such state action, an anti-
discrimination statute that has the effect of forcing a religiously 
affiliated law school to make such a choice would likely be considered 
an infringement on the free exercise of religion. Indeed, were an anti-
discrimination statute phrased in such a way that the religiously based 
admissions policy of a law school would be in violation of the statute, 
such a law school would be faced with a choice: (1) follow the precepts 
of the religion with which it is affiliated and forgo establishing a 
religious law school; or (2) alter its admissions policy in a manner that 
would be contrary to its religious teachings. Such a choice would likely 
be considered an infringement of such an institution’s free 
exercise rights. 
Thus, an infringement on a religiously affiliated law school’s free 
exercise rights can be justified only if the infringement serves to 
further a “compelling state interest.”200 The compelling state interest 
test is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law,”201 and 
“only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give 
occasion for permissible limitation.”202 Furthermore, the Court has 
held that the means adopted to further such a compelling state interest 
 
consequent destruction of [its] business and property.” Id. at 536. This suggests that 
organizations, including law schools, are able to bring suit on behalf of their patrons in order to 
seek an exemption from a neutral, generally applicable law. 
 198. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 438 (1963)). 
 199. Id. at 404 (finding that forcing an individual “to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand” is a burden). 
 200. Id. at 403 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438). 
 201. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
 202. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
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must be such that they restrict the right to free exercise of religion in 
as minimal a way as possible.203 
In the present case, the state would undoubtedly defend its 
interest in combatting discrimination as a compelling state interest. 
However, past precedent suggests that this interest would not be 
sufficiently compelling.204 In Dale, the state’s interest in combatting 
discrimination was insufficiently compelling as applied against the Boy 
Scouts of America—a secular organization.205 Furthermore, in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School,206 the Court 
found that a group’s free exercise rights serve to bolster its rights to 
freedom of association.207 Indeed, the Court stated that the “view that 
the [freedom of association] analysis should be the same, whether the 
association in question is the Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a 
social club . . . is hard to square with the text of the First 
Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of 
religious organizations.”208 Together, these two cases suggest that a 
state’s interest in combatting discrimination will almost certainly be 
found to be insufficient as applied against a religious organization—
including a religious law school. 
Furthermore, even if a state’s interest in combatting 
discrimination is found to be compelling, the state would have to show 
that there are no other means of achieving this interest that have a less 
restrictive effect on the right to free exercise of religion. In the present 
case, it is unlikely that anti-discrimination legislation is the least 
 
 203. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534. 
 204. Although the Supreme Court found the interest of combatting racial discrimination 
to be a compelling state interest in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court emphasized 
that it was “the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from the shackles of the 
‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,” 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that served to make 
this interest compelling. 461 U.S. 574, 595, 604 (1983). Numerous commentators have argued, 
on this basis, that a state interest in eradicating sexual-orientation discrimination would likely be 
insufficiently compelling. See, e.g., Amy Moore, Rife with Latent Power: Exploring the Reach of 
the IRS to Determine Tax-Exempt Status According to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of 
Judicial Deference, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 117 (2014); Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and 
the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 109–11 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
 205. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
 206. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694 (2012). 
 207. Id. at 706. 
 208. Id. 
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restrictive means of combatting discrimination. Indeed, because there 
are a vast number of law schools that do not have religiously-based 
admissions policies, any restriction of admission due to such policies 
would be slight. Furthermore, as lower courts have remarked, “market 
forces . . . tend to discourage” business entities from restricting the 
class of patrons with whom they will do business.209 As a result, there 
would be more than a sufficient number of law schools available for 
LGBT students. Legislation that has the effect of forcing a religiously 
affiliated law school to amend its admissions policy in a way that 
contravenes its religious precepts would not be seen as the least 
restrictive means of combatting discrimination. 
In summary, the free exercise of religion in America is robustly 
protected by various RFRA statutes and the First Amendment. Under 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the free 
exercise of religion includes the right to an exemption from a neutral, 
generally applicable law that inhibits the free exercise of religion, as 
long as it is combined with another constitutionally protected right. 
Because the admissions policies of religiously affiliated law schools 
ordinarily involve both a free exercise component and a freedom of 
association component, religiously affiliated law schools should be 
able to seek an exemption from non-discrimination statutes within the 
context of their admissions policies. Such law schools will be able to 
assert, on behalf of their students, that such anti-discrimination 
statutes interfere with both their free exercise of religion and their 
freedom of association. 
The various RFRA statutes and the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence allow for the interference of an individual’s free exercise 
of religion only if the state can show that it has a compelling interest 
for doing so and that the means used to further this interests are the 
means that least restrict the free exercise of religion. Given that the 
Court has recognized few interests as sufficiently compelling to justify 
an infringement on the free exercise of religion, it is unlikely that a 
state’s general interest in combatting discrimination will be found 
sufficiently compelling. Furthermore, it is not clear that anti-
discrimination legislation would be the most narrowly tailored means 
available to further this state interest. As a result, religious law schools 
would likely be exempt from having to comply with anti-
 
 209. Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994). 
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discrimination statutes that interfere with their students’ right to free 
exercise of religion and freedom of association. 
3. Current legal battles 
The dispute over the admissions policies of religiously affiliated 
law schools is, of course, but a microcosm of the larger debate that is 
currently embroiling the United States: How can the right to religious 
freedom coexist with anti-discrimination legislation designed to 
protect LGBT individuals? As societal norms and attitudes continue 
to evolve,210 it is likely that the intensity of these debates will increase. 
This section will provide an overview of the state of the law with 
regard to the rights to religious freedom vis à vis the rights of LGBT 
individuals. It will conclude with a brief examination of the legislation 
passed in the state of Utah, which has expressly sought to balance 
these rights. 
As noted, twenty-one states have enacted RFRA legislation.211 
These pieces of legislation generally seek to protect religious believers 
by stating that any governmental infringement of the right to religious 
freedom must be (1) in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.212 
At the same time, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have 
passed anti-discrimination legislation,213 the majority of which makes 
it illegal to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.214 The difficulty with much of the legislation that seeks to 
protect either the rights of religious believers or the rights of LGBT 
individuals is that such legislation appears threatening when enacted. 
For example, as the recent fracas in Indiana suggests, RFRAs can be 
seen as polarizing when enacted without any protections for LGBT 
individuals.215 Similarly, when California proposed anti-discrimination 
legislation that sought to mandate accommodation of LGBT 
 
 210. See supra note 55. 
 211. See supra note 179. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 200–203. 
 213. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-
Map, https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Adam B. Lerner, Mike Pence Reaps the Whirlwind, POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2015, 10:04 
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/mike-pence-indiana-gay-rights-116532. 
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individuals without exempting religious institutions, many religious 
adherents saw this as a threat to their religious freedom rights.216 
Utah has attempted to avoid such polarization by expressly 
including both rights in a single piece of legislation. Indeed, the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act was recently amended to include sexual 
orientation and gender identity as distinct classes, on the basis of 
which employers are prohibited from discriminating.217 At the same 
time, the Utah Antidiscrimination Act exempts various religious 
institutions and provides for a robust protection of religious liberty.218 
This approach has, thus far, been met with approval by advocates of 
both religious liberty rights and advocates of LGBT rights.219 While it 
is too early to discern whether this approach will eliminate future 
conflicts between the rights of religious liberty and anti-discrimination 
legislation, Utah’s approach seems to have had the effect of reducing 
some of acrimony surrounding the conflict of these rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Both Canada and America provide constitutional protection to 
religiously affiliated law schools that seek to reflect their purpose or 
character in their admissions policies. Under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, religiously affiliated law schools are protected 
from legislation or action from accrediting agencies that interferes 
with their right to freedom of religion as long as their admissions 
policies have a nexus to religion and the individuals attending the 
school sincerely believe that the admissions policy acts as a function of 
their spiritual faith. While this right is not absolute and may be subject 
to limitations, a blanket refusal to recognize graduates of such law 
schools will likely be seen as disproportionate—so long as previous 
jurisprudence is properly taken into account. 
In the American context, religiously affiliated law schools are 
protected from any action by the ABA that would interfere with their 
 
 216. See Patrick McGreevy, Faith-Based Colleges Say Anti-Discrimination Bill Would 
Infringe on Their Religious Freedom, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2016, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-religious-freedom-bill-20160622-snap-
story.html. 
 217. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106(1)(a)(i)(I)–(J) (West 2016). 
 218. Id. § 34A-5-102(1)(i)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 219. See Laurie Goodstein, Utah Passes Antidiscrimination Bill Backed by Mormon Leaders, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/utah-
passes-antidiscrimination-bill-backed-by-mormon-leaders.html?_r=0. 
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free exercise of religion. Indeed, both the federal government and a 
number of state governments have enacted RFRA legislation that 
grants religious actors exemptions from neutral, generally applicable 
laws. Furthermore, under the American Bill of Rights, the Free 
Exercise Clause likely grants religiously affiliated law schools an 
exemption—subject to the Sherbert balancing test—from generally 
applicable laws, so long as the free exercise claim is raised in 
conjunction with another guaranteed right. 
The legal protections guaranteed to religiously affiliated law 
schools help to ensure that both Canada and the United States 
maintain the viewpoint pluralism to which they are committed. 
Viewpoint pluralism is crucial in democratic countries as such 
countries are particularly prone to succumbing to the tyranny of the 
majority. As voluntary, independent associations, the ABA and the 
Canadian law societies are uniquely positioned to counteract this 
tendency. In order to maximize their capacity to counteract the 
potential of despotism in their respective countries, the ABA and the 
law societies of Canada should promote alternative law schools that 
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